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TELEPHONE JUSTICE IN RUSSIA: AN UPDATE 
 
Alena Ledeneva1 
 
This report continues our investigation into the predicament of the Russian legal system 
when faced by ‘telephone justice’ (telefonnoye pravo), various types of informal 
influence and pressure on the judiciary. The data were obtained from a nationwide survey 
conducted jointly in 2010 by the author, the Levada Research Centre and the EU-Russia 
Centre. Those findings were complemented by in-depth interviews with experts. The 
questions of the 2010 Survey repeat those asked in 2007 (Ledeneva 2008) in a survey 
aimed at monitoring public perceptions of ‘telephone justice’.  
 
In political terms the two surveys reflect the changes associated with the presidency of 
Dmitry Medvedev, who was elected in March 2008. The first survey was conducted in 
June 2007, well before Medvedev’s nomination as a presidential candidate, and was 
representative of Putin’s Russia. The 2010 Survey was conducted in November, a month 
before the end of Mikhail Khodorkovsky’s second trial and his new 14-year-sentence,2 
and a short while before the sensation caused by the revelations of Natalya Vasilyeva, 
press aide to the trial Judge Viktor Danilkin. In stating that this particular ‘emperor has 
no clothes’ Vasilyeva provided a predictable yet still shocking insider account of the 
‘atmosphere’ surrounding the trial.3 The three years separating the surveys thus coincided 
with a period of hope.  
 
In chronological order, the following developments shaped high expectations. One, a 
political will to address the issue of judicial independence emerged. Dmitry Medvedev, 
himself a lawyer, famously criticised Russia’s “legal nihilism” during his election 
campaign and after becoming president he continued to focus his efforts on issues 
surrounding the independence of the judiciary. Two, the need for an independent 
judiciary became part of the wider agenda of modernization, aimed at improving the 
climate for domestic businesses and foreign investors, as well as targeting social aspects 
of modernization. Three, a succession of public scandals in Moscow provided an 
opportunity to launch investigations and to fire law-enforcement officials. In 2009 
Russian lawyer Sergei Magnitsky died in prison after being incarcerated for a year 
without charge for exposing deep corruption at the Interior Ministry. Businesswoman 
Vera Trifonova, denied medical treatment in a Moscow pre-trial detention centre, also 
died in custody in April 2010. Life-threatening and grave assaults were made on 
                                                 
1Professor in Politics and Society, School of Slavonic and East European Studies, University College 
London. The 2010 Survey was conducted with financial support from the EU-Russia Centre; the 2007 
Survey was part of the British Academy Research Grant SG-43818. I am grateful to Piotr Drozd and 
Costanza Curro, my postgraduate students, who generously contributed their expertise and enthusiasm to 
the preparation of this report, including help with the data analysis, formatting, graphics, and copy-editing. 
2 Having been sentenced to 14 years but already having served 7, Mikhail Khodorkovsky and Platon 
Lebedev will be jailed for another 7 years. 
3 See ‘Sensation: An Interview with Judge Danilkin’s Assistant,’ Gazeta.ru, hro.org, 14 February 2011. Go 
to http://www.khodorkovskycenter.com/sites/khodorkovskycenter.com/files/Gazeta%20140211T.pdf  for 
an English translation of the interview in its entirety. 
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journalists Mikhail Beketov in late 2008 and Oleg Kashin in November 20104. Four, 
signs of resistance and demands for change5 were communicated through personal 
appeals to the President. Businessmen who found themselves subject to the aggressive 
attention of the tax police6, and the likes of Alexei Dymovsky who was the first police 
officer }} to place his video appeal on YouTube, [tried to reach over the heads of 
intervening officials].7 The most influential of all, perhaps, was the investigative blog of 
lawyer-activist Alexei Navalny who waged a personal campaign to expose corruption.8 In 
October 2010 Navalny became ‘virtual Mayor of Moscow’. In an Internet poll that 
month, conducted jointly by the Kommersant and Vedomosti newspapers, Navalny took 
more than 45% of the overall vote.9 Finally, overwhelming evidence of the pressure 
exerted on judges and the courts was made public by the judiciary itself.  
                                                 
4 Mikhail Beketov, chief editor of “Khimkinskaya Pravda”, was beaten and left for dead in the Moscow 
suburb of Khimki. Oleg Kashin, a journalist with the  “Kommersant” daily, was brutally attacked in the city 
centre. 
 
5 There has emerged a new form of civic action – bottom-up, Internet-coordinated, and legally informed. 
The most pronounced, perhaps, was the campaign against the privileges of officialdom on the streets and 
roads. It was organized by the Federation of Russian Automobilists (FAR) and the campaign slogan 
“Servant of the people, turn off that flashing beacon” spread the movement across fifty cities. An 
independent poll conducted by the Levada Centre found that 78 percent of the population expressed support 
for the campaign begun by FAR. See Alisa Shtykina, “Grazhdane podderzhivaiut bor'bu s migalkami,” 
Kommersant. Daily,No. 77, April 30, 2010, page: 4, http://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/21808531 
Another Internet community called on its members to follow the example of Moscow businessman Andrei 
Hartley who refused to give way to the car of presidential advisor Vladimir Shevchenko. Supporters should 
use their mobile phones to film violations of traffic regulations by official cars, they were told, and make 
them public on the Internet. See Aleksandr Kolesnichenko, Valerii Iakov, “Problesk Pobedy nad 
migalkami” Novye izvestiia, No. 77, April 30, 2010, page(s): 4 
http://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/21806809 
 
6 Evgeny Chichvarkin made his Internet appeal to President Medvedev from London, naming 11 [police}}] 
officers and two generals who were behind the corporate raiding on Evroset, of which he was co-owner. 
The investigation of the related criminal cases was }}closed on 25 January 2011. Evgeny Lebedev 
published an open letter to Prime Minister Putin in February 2011.  
7 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=R4vB2a15dOU . 
 
8 Before becoming a “civic activist,” Navalny was a leading member of the Yabloko party. In 2007, under 
the banner of their Democratic Alternative (Demokraticheskaya alternative) Movement (aka “DA!”), he 
and Masha Gaidar held a debate in a Moscow bar that turned ugly. After a drunken group of United Russia 
youths disrupted the event, Navalny confronted them outside on the street. When the thugs refused to leave, 
Navalny shot their foolish leader twice with an air-pistol and ended up wrestling him on the ground. 
Nobody pressed charges but Yabloko threw Navalny out of the party for “causing it political damage”. He 
has since acted as a consultant to the Governor of the Kirov Region, Nikita Belykh. (A former member of 
the Union of Right Forces, Belykh is now despised in liberal circles after abandoning the party and the 
Solidarity movement in late 2008 to take up the Kirov appointment. Masha Gaidar, incidentally, followed 
}}Navalny there.) 
 
9 Writing for Grani.ru, political analyst Stanislav Belkovsky explained that Navalny’s victory symbolized 
the arrival of a new generation of opposition }}politicians, who were both non-confrontational and 
effective. Navalny fell into a new category of dissident, said Belkovsky: the “civic activist” (grazhdanskii 
aktivist), someone who seeks concessions from the establishment and espouses an “ethical and aesthetic” 
opposition to the ruling system. This new group of activists enjoys greater popularity, according to 
Belkovsky, because they are not pursuing political careers and avoid radical, anti-establishment rhetoric. 
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In 2009 Vladimir Yaroslavtsev and Anatoly Kononov, two judges at the Constitutional 
Court, were forced to resign because they had talked to foreign media. Their critique of 
the judiciary’s inner workings was as poignant as that of Judge Olga Kudeshkina, herself 
unfairly suspended five years earlier by Moscow City Court Chairwoman Olga 
Yegorova. (Kudeshkina took her case to the European Court of Human Rights and 
won.10) The First Deputy Chair of the Supreme Arbitration Court of Russia, Elena 
Valyavina, testified in court that Valery Boyev, an official in the Presidential 
Administration,11 had approached her with instructions on how to decide a high-profile 
case12. In the event of non-compliance he threatened her with career problems. Her 
statements constituted the ‘overwhelming evidence’ cited in extradition cases before 
London courts to illustrate the reality of political pressure on the Russian judiciary.  
 
                                                                                                                                                 
Kommersant described Navalny’s politics as ‘balanced’. He did not praise FAR’s Sergei Kanaev, 
Konstantin Doroshok of }}Spravedlivost, or even Khimki }}forest activist Evgeniia Chirikova. Instead, 
Navalny celebrated }}Democratic Choice (DemVybora), Vladimir Milov’s 200-member project, which 
aims to participate in }}the 2011 parliamentary elections and the presidential elections next year. (Milov 
created the group as a Solidarnost breakaway when that movement’s leadership refused to become a 
registered political party.) The DemVybora plug comes as no surprise. Navalny apparently consults  Milov 
about the energy industry, which is presumably very valuable when building his lawsuits against energy 
monopolies. The heart of Navalny’s current work is advocating minority shareholders’ rights. The strategy 
has been to buy shares of State corporations and then demand (legally guaranteed) access to insider 
company information. He has filed lawsuits against Surgutneftegaz, Transneft, Rosneft, Gazpromneft, 
TNK-BP and the VTB bank. 
 
Source: http://www.agoodtreaty.com/2010/10/20/navalnyi-virtual-mayor-of-moscow/ . 
10ECtHR ruling No 29492/05 Kudeshkina v. Russia,26 February 2009. For details see Judge Olga B. 
Kudeshkina’s speech, 1 March 2010, ‘Deeds not words: The present failings of judicial reform in Russia’ 
www.eu-russiacentre.org/eurc/judge-olga-kudeshkinas-speech.html . 
 
11 Valery Boyev is an assistant in the personnel and State decorations department of the Presidential 
Administration. The activities of the department were formerly supervised by presidential aide Viktor 
Ivanov who, on 15 May 2008, was appointed Director of the RF Federal Service for The }}Control of 
Narcotics Trade. Boyev’s office was not in itself particularly significant. However, he also represents the 
Presidential Administration on the Supreme }}Qualification Judges Board, which plays an important role in 
the appointment and dismissal of high-ranking judges. Among its appointees are the chairpersons and 
deputy chairpersons of the Supreme Court and the Supreme Arbitration Court, who are appointed by the 
Federation Council (the upper chamber of the Russian parliament) on the recommendation }}proposal of 
the President. In the case of a deputy chairperson of either Court the presidential recommendation 
}}proposal must be based on a proposal by the chairperson of the respective court. In any case, a positive 
opinion by Board is legally required in order to }}confirm the appointment. 
 
12 The case concerned the TogliattiAzot joint-stock company, the country’s greatest producer of ammonia. 
In 1996 a State share of 6.1% in the company capital was privatised (sold to a private company). In 2004 
the Ministry of }}Property Relations challenged the privatisation deal in an arbitration court, arguing that it 
had been in breach of then-current law. After two lower-court decisions upholding the deal, the third-
instance Arbitration court decided the case in favor of the State agency. An appeal to the Supreme 
Arbitration Court followed. Valyavina took the case because none of the other judges at the Court were 
willing to oversee the hearing because, apparently, they were concerned about possible personal 
repercussions}}. Valyavina made certain preliminary decisions on the case, in particular, lifting a 
preliminary injunction against convening a general meeting of TogliattiAzot }}shareholders.  
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Yet these developments, arguably, have not weakened the grip of the “system” (sistema) 
on economic and political actors, and that includes the President himself. A sharp critique 
of Putin’s sistema was provided in Mikhail Khodorkovsky’s earlier publications and in 
his last words to Moscow’s Khamovnichesky district court on 2 November 2010. In 
particular he stressed how important it was for the successful modernisation of Russia 
that the judiciary be made independent of such unwritten instructions and commands 
(telephone justice) 13.  
 
“Let's ask ourselves: What do entrepreneurs, high-ranking industrial managers or 
just educated and creative people think today when they look at our trial and what, 
I assume, will be its absolutely predictable result? The obvious conclusion of any 
rational person is frightening in its simplicity. The security services can do 
anything. There is no right to private property. Those who clash with the system 
have no rights whatsoever. Even though rights are enshrined in law they are not 
defended in court, because the courts are either afraid of the system or form a part 
of it. Can we be surprised that rational people do not strive for self-fulfilment here, 
in Russia? Who then will modernize the economy? The prosecutors? The police? 
The security service?” 
 
In these two surveys our purpose has been to monitor changes in popular perceptions, of 
‘telephone justice’ and of the independence of the judiciary, so as to complement other 
types of analysis made of Russia’s judicial system (Global Corruption Report 2007; 
Gorbuz, Krasnov, Michina and Satarov 2010; Hendley 2007, 2010; Huskey 1992; 
Mishina and Krasnov 2006; Sakwa 2010; Satarov 2005; Solomon 2008; Trochev 2008; 
Volkov 2011). 
 
How do you understand “telefonnoye pravo”? 
 
The 2010 Survey was designed to collect data on popular perceptions of telephone justice 
and was conducted by the Levada Centre, Russia’s most respected survey institute. A 
nationwide, stratified random sample of 1,593 adults (aged 18 and over) was interviewed 
at home between 19 and 22 November 2010, in both urban and rural areas of the Russian 
Federation. The sample did not include temporary residents – people on business trips, 
for example, those taking vacations or undergoing medical treatment, servicemen and 
women in the Russian, or people detained in prison and the wider penitentiary system. }} 
didn’t understand sentence omitted here (residence status). The sample was built on the 
basis of a multi-stage, stratified selection of locations for interviewing, as described in 
detail on the Levada Centre website.14  
 
To distinguish various contexts in which the term “telefonnoe pravo” is used today, and 
to create an inclusive list of its possible meanings for our main survey question (“What is 
telefonnoe pravo?”), I conducted a content analysis of the }}national and regional press 
                                                 
13 Speech by Mikhail Khodorkovsky, www.khodorkovsky.ru , 2 November 2010. 
 
14 See methodological reports and statistics of success rates of home visits at www.levada.ru. 
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in Russia since 2000. The source was the Eastview electronic database, which contains 65 
national and 111 regional publications.15 This helped us to assess, albeit impression-
istically, what people might associate with the term.  
 
Table 1: Q. “What, in your opinion, is 'telephone justice'?” 
Respondents were invited to make multiple choices 
 
Responses (in decreasing order of frequency; responses in text thus [2]) 2010 
 1. Hard to say 35 
 2. Court decisions made on orders “from above" (sverkhu) 29 
 3. Pressure on judges / prosecutors by State officials (chinovniki) 20 
 4. Court decisions that result from bribery (po zakazu) 14 
 5. Cases are opened and closed in response to bribery (po zakazu) 13 
 6. Pressure on judges / prosecutors by State security services (spetssluzhby) 10 
 7. Pressure on judges / prosecutors by criminal groups 9 
 8. Selective law enforcement: the opening and closing of cases  
is influenced by the status of the opponent 
9 
 9. Selective law enforcement: court decisions are influenced  
by the status of the opponent 
8 
10. Pressure on judges by prosecutors 7 
11. Right of the detained to make a phone call (or calls) 6 
12. Legislation in the area of telephone communications, tariffs etc. 6 
13. "Basmannoye-style” justice: the way the Khodorkovsky case was heard,  
conducted and judged 
2 
 14. Other 1 
 
One example. I included a post-Soviet connotation of the term that has appeared in media 
headlines concerning the introduction of tariffs for local calls (these were formerly 
covered by the monthly line rental). Then there was a literal reading of the idiom to mean 
the “right to make a telephone call”. These two usages were included in order to filter out 
those unsure about the term’s application but unwilling to acknowledge the fact 
(Vaksberg 1986, 2003). To avoid an artificial inflation of certain answers the multiple 
choice options kept close to the phrases used in the media.  Respondents were likewise 
invited to choose as many prompts on the card as they needed to define the term. The 
answers in Table 1 are organized in order of decreasing frequency.  
 
More than one third of respondents (35%) found it “hard to say” [1] what telefonnoye 
pravo meant.16 This percentage has hardly changed since 2007 (34%), despite the growth 
                                                 
15 “The Universal Database of Regional Russian Newspapers (UDB-REG) provides close-up coverage of 
developments throughout Russia's regions,” says its online description. “This database currently presents 
newspapers from all seven Federal Districts of the Russian Federation and includes coverage of local issues 
in Moscow and St. Petersburg. The database represents such noteworthy regions as the troubled Northern 
Caucasus (Groznenskii rabochii from Chechnya, Severnaia Osetiia from Northern Osetiia-Alania, etc.), oil 
& gas rich Western Siberia (Tiumenskie izvestiia, etc.), the investment-friendly Volga region 
(Nizhegorodskie novosti from Nizhny Novgorod, Samarskie Izvestia from Samara), and many others. The 
selected newspapers have the largest circulation in their regions and are considered as most authoritative.” 
See http://dlib.eastview.com/sources/publications . 
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(from 30 to 36%) in the proportion saying they had experience of dealing with the 
judicial system, either personally or through family and friends. People who struggled to 
define the term tended to be young (43% of those aged 18-24) or older than 55 (39%), 
and more often women (38%) than men (32%). Younger respondents’ choices tended to 
deviate significantly and most frequently from the average: only 14% of the 18-24 age 
group, for example, chose “pressure on judges / prosecutors by State officials” [3] 
compared with 20% overall. With the exception of two test prompts (“legislation in the 
area of telephone communications” [11] and “right of the detained to make a phone call” 
[10]) the percentage of responses from the younger age group was significantly less in all 
cases than that of other groups. These findings confirm that younger people are less 
familiar with a practice that has its origins in the Soviet period. 
 
The basic meaning of the term “telephone justice” [2] was selected by 29% of 
respondents, making it the most frequently chosen definition. It would be useful to 
identify the most stable clusters of definitions for those selecting more than one prompt 
(an average of 1.7 responses per person). The two thirds of respondents who did not find 
it “hard to say” what the term meant, however, most favoured the basic meaning of 
“orders from above”. Respondents identified other forms of pressure [3], which do not 
necessarily come directly from above but are external to the judicial hierarchy (e.g. 
pressure by State officials). These they associated with informal influence) or [3, 4] 
financial inducements (zakaz). Interestingly, although the second Khodorkovsky trial was 
held in the period between the two surveys, the percentage of respondents who associated 
“telephone justice” with ‘Basmannoye’ (now ‘Khamovnicheskoye)’ justice [13], i.e. the 
way this case was heard, conducted and judged, slightly decreased – from 4% in 2007 to 
2% in 2010.  
 
The data from another national survey recently showed that over a third (37%) of 
respondents consider the Khodorkovsky-Lebedev case to be an example of “pre-ordered” 
decision-making in court but the number of people directly linking “telephone justice” 
(telefonnoye pravo) to this case was exiguous. Arguably, this figure would have been 
different if either Judge Olga Kudeshkina’s case or the Vasilyeva interview had been 
reported on national television. According to Radio Echo Moskvy, however, only one  
TV channel reported an interview with Vasilyeva. 
 
Unlawful use of the Russian courts 
 
Table 2 shows that about a quarter of respondents (26%) also had difficulty in answering 
the second main survey question, “Do you think that the Russian judicial system has been 
used for unlawful purposes in the last seven years?” Those who did volunteer judgments 
on the multiple choices in this table produced a somewhat shocking result.  
                                                                                                                                                 
16 I have conducted a survey on blat (influence, connections) to compare perceptions of different informal 
practices in Russia. In that survey people found it much less “hard to say” what was meant (9%) than in the 
“telephone justice” survey (30%). 
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Table 2: Q. “Do you think that the Russian judicial system has been used for unlawful 
purposes in the last seven years?” Respondents were invited to make multiple choices 
 
Responses (in decreasing order of frequency; responses in text thus [2] ) 2007 2010 
1.  Hard to say 27 26 
2. Yes, show trials are conducted to demonstrate to society  
the attitude of the authorities to certain actions or phenomena 
27 23 
3. Yes, the judicial system is used for political ends, in order to harass  
and get  rid of political opponents 
21 19 
4. Yes, the judicial system is used to undermine business competitors,  
to ruin their reputation or to capture their business  
20 19 
5. It might be used, but little is known about it 19 19 
6. Yes, the judicial system is used to settle personal conflicts and for revenge 16 18 
7. Even if it is so used, it serves the right purposes 3 2 
8. No, the judicial system in Russia is not used for any unlawful purposes 4 4 
 
A dismally low share of respondents associated the judicial system with the rule of law: 
only 4% (3% in 2007) were convinced that the judicial system was not used for any 
unlawful purposes [8]. The remaining responses emphasized the misuse of law [2, 3] for 
political purposes (19% political ends; 23% show trials), closely followed [4] by 
commercial purposes (19%) and [6] personal purposes (18%). Almost one in five (19%) 
assumed that the judicial system could be used manipulatively but lacked specific 
information [5].  
 
These data show that no substantial change has taken place in the last three years, either 
in the popular perception of these matters or in Russian citizens’ distrust of institutions. 
They also point to possible reasons for the “legal nihilism” widely publicized by 
President Medvedev (Medvedev, 2008). It must be stressed that the spirit of ‘legal 
nihilism’ relies on formal and outward compliance with the law. This, in turn, produces 
informal practices based on an “emphasis on the letter of the law and the increasing 
expertise of players in its manipulation” (Ledeneva, 2006, p. 190). In other words, the 
law becomes an integral part of strategy in politics and business. Statistics from the past 
decade show, on the one hand, more use being made of the courts but, on the other hand, 
a rise in the incidence of corporate raiding and other “legal” forms of capturing 
businesses (Firestone 2008, 2010; Volkov 2004; Yakovlev 2006; Woodruff 2008; 
Biberman 2008). It is also indicative that the positive trend in statistics and in modus 
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operandi, especially in arbitration courts (Hendley 2007), has not yet found expression in 
an overall respect for the law and trust in legal institutions.17  
 
Close examination of Tables 1 and 2 helps to uncover the multiple uses to which the 
judicial system is put in Russia. The most disturbing finding, perhaps, is that only 4% of 
respondents consistently say that the judicial system is not used for any unlawful 
purposes. This figure was cross-checked in other questions concerning, respectively, the 
courts and the prosecutor’s office. 
 
Graph 1:  
Q. “In your opinion, what, aside from the law, exerts the strongest influence on the work of 
Russian courts and judges?” and Q. “What, aside from the law, guides the activities of 
Russian procurators (prosecutors) and what influences their actions?” 
 
Respondents were invited to make multiple choices 
 
 
 
As Graph 1 illustrates, a comparable proportion of respondents (just under 7%) chose to 
say that ‘nothing but the law’ influences the workings of the courts and the procurator’s 
(prosecutors) office in Russia. The 2010 data also show a range of unlawful incentives 
used to manipulate the judiciary. Still, there are signs of some positive trends. Compared 
to the findings of our 2007 Survey the attributed influence exerted over judges by certain 
factors (personal gain, money, and bribes) is perceived to have declined to 46% in 2010: 
                                                 
17 See data on trust in courts. 
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in 2007 55% of respondents acknowledged their significance. The use of personal 
connections and informal relationships has also decreased, respondents say, from 47% to 
41% while the influence of oral commands and other forms of influence “from above” 
has been reduced from 24% to 22%. 
 
The factors which respondents saw as influencing the work of the prosecutor’s office 
follow a similar pattern. As selected by the general sample, 42% named bribery; 38% 
named informal requests; and 29% singled out the status of opponents. One particular 
point of interest: the response “directives from above” came fourth in people’s 
perceptions of other extra-legal factors of influence on “telephone justice” (22% for the 
courts, 24% for the prosecutor’s office). 
 
Graph 2.  
Differences in assessing pressure / influence on judges between those with,  
and without, personal experience of the judicial system 
Respondents were invited to make multiple choices 
 
 
 
However, the findings of both the 2007 and 2010 surveys also suggest people’s 
perception of the behaviour of the prosecutor’s office18 does have certain nuances. Judges 
                                                 
18 (JC) The years from 2007 to 2010 saw certain potentially major changes in the functions and powers of 
the prosecutor’s office (more correctly speaking, the procuracy). Its investigative activities, overseeing 
investigations into more serious crimes and offences committed by officials (including the police), were 
given greater departmental autonomy within the Prosecutor General’s Office in 2007 and then constituted 
in 2010 as an independent agency, the Investigative Committee.  
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were seen as more corrupt and receptive to material stimuli. Prosecutors were considered 
more obedient and responsive to directives from above, though the proportion holding the 
latter view has decreased over the three intervening years from 28% to 24%. 
 
If we contrast the opinions of those who rely on the media and hearsay with the views of 
individuals who have had direct experience of the system (“as a litigant, plaintiff or 
defendant, a victim or a suspect, a witness or a jury member etc.”) the percentages in 
2010 rise to 56% for bribery and 46% for informal requests, but decrease to 26% for the 
status of opponents. Graph 2 shows that those in Russia with personal exposure to the 
judicial system (14% of total respondents) seem to hold more negative views about 
almost every type of influence to which a judge might be subjected, from material interest 
to political pressure. 
 
Overall the data from both surveys reveal the public to be aware of telephone justice – 
exercised both through directives from above and informal requests – and those with 
direct experience of the judicial system are more likely to believe in its existence. Low 
expectations of State institutions in politics and business, as I have argued, lead over time 
to the proliferation of informal practices (Ledeneva, 2006, p.26). This has created an 
additional incentive for cheating the State and placing trust elsewhere. The same 
argument applies to the courts. 
 
The most convincing evidence about “telephone justice”, however, comes from the 
judges themselves and from experts. Increasingly such evidence can be found in official 
reports. “Formally speaking, judges are independent and must be guided solely by the 
law. In practice they do not possess genuine, as opposed to declaratory, independence,” 
states the President’s Advisory Council on Civil Society and Human Rights. It continues  
 
“... The powers of a judge who does not agree to carry out the requests may be 
prematurely terminated, whether it is the court chairman or another influential 
person who indicates the desired outcome of the case. In such a situation the 
conscientious judge finds himself (or herself) open to pressure from within the 
judicial system and has no chance of defending his or her own rights. As a result, 
fewer conscientious judges remain and their other colleagues fear to cross the 
court chairman and take decisions based on the law. The dependence of judges on 
officials within the judicial system is intensified. Our findings show that the 
subordinate position of judges is deepened by a simulated combating of violations, 
and the pretence of struggling against infringements of the law among judges. In 
reality, under the guise of combating these infringements conscientious judges are 
being expelled from the profession.” 
 
Similar conclusions were reached in a report commissioned by Moscow’s Institute for 
Contemporary Development and published in October 2009 by the Centre for Political 
Technologies as “The judicial system in Russia: its present condition and the issues it 
                                                                                                                                                 
The office has retained its functions of oversight of law-enforcement by all agencies and prosecution in 
court. The formal innovations of the past three years are still untried and as yet unlikely to have penetrated  
or in any way altered public perceptions of the procuracy or prosecutor’s office. 
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faces”. Both reports have been cited by Judge Kudeshkina to support her account of the 
pressure she experienced at the hands of the Moscow City Court chairwoman.  
 
Our 2010 Survey tested whether these whistle-blowing judges resonate with the public or 
are viewed, on the contrary, as bitter and resentful at their loss of position. The survey 
data clearly indicate that the elements of resentment attributed to such judges – desire for 
vengeance (10%) or to compromise (6%) and slander (3%) their colleagues – are 
significantly outweighed by what is seen as a loss of fear (36%), a shrugging off of 
dependence (or krugovaya poruka19) (30%) and efforts to change (13%) or monitor (8%) 
the judicial system from the outside.  
 
Table 3: “In what way are court decisions in your locality most often made?”  
Respondents were invited to choose only one option 
 
Prompts offered for this question 2007 2010 
1. All, or practically all, court decisions are made in accordance with the law 12 12 
2. There are judges who take bribes and are subject to pressure “from above” but they are few 18 19 
 3. Judges, as a rule, take bribes and are subject to pressure “from above”, but there are also 
principled judges 
25 25 
 4. Even principled judges react to pressure “from above” on certain cases 21 18 
 5. Practically all court decisions are taken for a bribe or under pressure “from above” 7 6 
 6. Do not agree with any of these 17 21 
 
Data from the 2010 Survey replicated trends noted in 2007. There has been a significant 
increase, however, in the number of respondents who relate outspoken criticism by 
former judges to their loss of fear (from 31% in 2007 to 36%). The latter trend may also 
be ascribed to the growing intimidation of those opposed to the Russian central 
authorities, creating an atmosphere not only induced by the Khodorkovsky case but also 
by recent acts of violence against journalists and civic activists. 
 
The regional dimension 20 
 
The survey data are more reliable, in all probability, when people are asked about events 
in their locality. The Moscow controversy over the influence of city authorities on the 
city’s courts is not unique, as certain analyses confirm (Solov’ev, 2007; Dobrovinski, 
2002). Nevertheless one assumes regional variation in Russia.  
                                                 
19 See Ledeneva 2004, Hosking 2004. 
 
20 In 2010 responses concerning the North Caucasus region were included under those for the Southern 
Federal District although in }}2009 the region was transferred (with the Stavropol Region) out of the 
Southern Federal District to constitute a separate North Caucasus Federal District. 
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Table 3 shows the distribution of replies when respondents were asked how court 
decisions were made in their locality. It included a further option [6] for those who 
disagreed with the suggested formulae (respondents were asked to choose one 
response21). 
 
Approximately one third of respondents seemed satisfied with the workings of local 
courts: 12% replied that all court decisions were made in accordance with the law, and 
19% said only a few judges take bribes and are subject to pressure [1, 2]. One }}half [3, 
4, 5] of respondents, however, acknowledged that judges were not independent and were 
influenced either by corrupt payments or other forms of pressure.  
 
A quarter of respondents said that judges, as a rule, take bribes although there were also 
some principled judges [3]. Even these principled judges would react to pressure on 
certain cases, said another 18% [4] while a further 6% of respondents [5] indicated that 
“all court decision are taken either for a bribe or under pressure ‘from above’.” Slightly 
more than one in five respondents (21%) did not agree [6] with any of the suggested 
choices.  
 
Table 4: Q. “In what way are court decisions in your locality most often made?”  
(by Federal Districts22) Respondents were invited to make one choice 
 
Prompts offered for this question Average NW C So V U Si FE 
 1. All or practically all court decisions are made 
in accordance with the law 
12 1 8 12 17 12 12  30 
2. There are judges who take bribes and are 
subject to pressure “from above”, but they are 
few 
19 14 19 18 25 13 18 15 
 3. Judges, as a rule, take bribes and are subject 
to pressure “from above”, but there are also 
principled judges 
25 23 27 28 18 23 26 27 
 4. Even principled judges react to pressure 
“from above” on certain cases 
18 25 18 14 17 28 18 9 
 5. Practically all court decisions are taken for a 
bribe or under pressure “from above” 
6 10 4 12 5 2 6 6 
 6. Do not agree with any of these 21 26 25 16 19 22 20 14 
 
When we look at the 2010 Survey data regionally (Table 4), the curve of averages has not 
changed significantly in comparison to 2007 (10-18-24-24-6-21%).23 Yet there were 
some striking differences in data for two Federal Districts – North Western and Far 
                                                 
21 With the kind permission of the Director, I have used the Levada Centre’s data and archives on its 
surveys about the Russian judicial system to expand a five-fold standard scale of unlawful pressures on 
judges that is measured in frequency (never, sometimes, frequently, almost always, always) into five 
formulae that add an interpretative element to the frequencies.  
22 }}Respectively, in Table 4, North Western, Central, South, Volga, Urals, Siberian and Far Eastern 
Federal Districts. 
23 I do not include a complete set of 2007 data, they are available in full in (Ledeneva, 2008). 
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Eastern. In comparison to its 2007 curve (13-20-17-27-2-21%), the distribution of 
answers in North Western Federal District indicates sharp deterioration (1-14-23-25-10-
26%). Replies to the first prompt [1] that “all or practically all court decisions are made in 
accordance with the law” have gone down from 13% to 1% in North Western (also down 
from 13% to 8% in Central, from 15% to 12% in Urals and Siberian Federal Districts). 
Responses in the Volga, South, and particularly in Far Eastern Federal Districts went up: 
from 10% in 2007 to 17% in 2010 in Volga, from 10% to 12% in South, and from 14% in 
2007 to impressive 30% in 2010 in Far Eastern Federal Districts. It can be argued, 
therefore, that there were perceptions, respectively, of a significant or small improvement 
in the enforcement of law. The North Western, Central and Far Eastern Federal Districts 
certainly displayed diverging trends.  
 
If we analyze the second prompt in Table 4 (“there are judges who take bribes and are 
subject to pressure ‘from above’ but they are few”) the Volga Federal District (25%) 
registered above average, while the Central Federal District matched the national 
response (19%) and the South and Siberian Federal Districts at 18% measured just below 
average. Three other districts were a little less confident about the prevalence of judicial 
bribe-taking: North Western (14%), Urals (13%), and Far Eastern (15%). If we combine 
responses to the first and second prompts, the regional data range from a low of 15% in 
the North Western Federal District to a high of 44% in the Far Eastern Federal District as 
against a national average of 30%. (In 2007 the range was smaller and different regions 
lay at the two extremes, from a low of 22% in the Southern Federal District to a high of 
38% in the Ural Federal District. The national average then was also 30%). Prompt 2 was 
the most popular reply (25%) in the Volga Federal District and combined with prompt 1 
gave a total of 42%. This was still a little less than the Far Eastern Federal District, the 
part of Russia where people’s responses were consistently more optimistic than elsewhere 
– 30%, 15%, 27%, 9% and 6%, respectively, on prompts 1 to 5. (In 2007 it was the Volga 
Federal District which displayed a similar trend.)  
 
The third prompt (“judges, as a rule, take bribes and are subject to pressure ‘from above’, 
but there are also principled judges”) was the most popular choice overall, selected by an 
average 25% of all respondents. Among respondents in four of the country’s main 
regions it did not come first. The Urals Federal District scored highest (28%) on the 
fourth, even less optimistic, prompt (“even principled judges react to the pressure ‘from 
above’ on certain cases”). So did the North Western Federal District (25%).  
The most pessimistic choice [5], indicating that practically all court decisions are taken 
for a bribe or under pressure “from above”, was also the least popular (6% on average). 
No doubt, further breakdown of data into the 83 constituent subjects of the Russian 
Federation would show yet more extensive variation, as even neighbouring Regions 
(oblast, krai) often differ significantly in their political regimes and models of 
governance.  
 
Finally, when faced by an allegedly unfair sentence to their detriment, it is worthy of note 
that respondents in 2010 displayed an increased distrust of independent agencies. The 
proportion who would contact a lawyer for advice, for example, declined from 33% in 
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2007 to 23% in 2010. There was a parallel growth, on the other hand, in the numbers who 
would make a complaint to a higher court (from 14% to 22%). 
 
Conclusion 
 
The data of the 2010 Survey do not show substantial change in the trends that emerged in 
2007, with an exception of a number of intriguing regional dynamics. Notwithstanding a 
few encouraging signs of improvement in the popular perception of the Russian judicial 
system, respondents still consider patterns of extra-legal pressure on the judiciary to be 
widespread.  
 
What is the relation between people’s perceptions and the actual incidence of telephone 
justice? In studying corruption in Russia Rose and Mishler demonstrated that perception 
was not a satisfactory proxy for experience: they found a large discrepancy between 86% 
who perceived most public officials as corrupt and the 23% who said their household had 
paid a bribe in the past two years (Rose and Mishler, 2007, pp. 7-8).24 The ‘Life in 
Transition’ surveys, conducted by the European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development, also noted a difference between indicators of perception and experience.25 
Perceptions are often criticized as influenced by the circulation of information, locally or 
through the media, and by the perceived fairness of public officials (Miller, Grodeland 
and Koshechkina, 2001, pp. 91, 279). Rose and Mishler found that neither the number of 
bribes nor the number of contacts with public officials significantly affected the 
perception of corruption. They made their case with regard to health, education, the 
police, social security and }}permits office, army recruiting and tax inspection. They 
notably excluded the courts from their study.  
 
Conversely, our 2010 Survey indicated that people who have had personal exposure 
(14%) to the courts are more critical than those with only mediated knowledge of the 
judicial system. This finding needs further analysis. It would be useful to see whether the 
type of court (Lambert-Mogiliansky, Sonin and Zhuravskaya 2007) or type of litigation 
matters (Volkov et al. 2011); whether the experience in court differs in nature to the 
experience of other Russian public institutions; or whether corruption in the courts is 
under-represented in the media. Given our data, however, the perceptions of respondents 
with personal experience of the judicial system in Russia back up the opinions of others, 
even if their perceptions may have been influenced by unfavourable court decisions. The 
patterns of informality persist and require further study.  
 
                                                 
24 Among the 86% of Russians who perceive public officials as corrupt, 35% believe almost all public 
officials to be corrupt while 51% think that most officials are corrupt. One in ten (9%) say that less than 
half of officials are corrupt; only 5% think that very few officials are corrupt. These perceptions are 
consistent with the opinion that public officials are not trustworthy (Rose and Mishler, 2007, p. 11). 
 
25 For comparison see CEELBAS website. 
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In 2007 I solicited comments on the survey from a range of experts – lawyers, human 
rights activists, academics and public intellectuals. They largely agreed on the following 
formula: while it is ridiculous to suggest that every court case in Russia is decided 
according to directives from above or on the basis of alternative incentives, it is perfectly 
possible to imagine that a way to influence a particular case can be found if necessary. 
The pressure does not have to be pervasive to be effective, in other words. The form of 
influence, moreover, can be tailored to suit the personality of a judge. Court chairmen and 
women possess an arsenal of measures to deal with non-compliant judges, and can twist 
their personal integrity in a calculating way. Direct forms of influence may even be 
redundant when an atmosphere of “suspended punishment” creates patterns of 
dependence on the courts’ chairmen and women, and induces}} self-censorship, the need 
to play by “unwritten rules.”  
 
In 2007 none of the acting judges I approached to provide a commentary on the data 
would agree to do so. In 2010 there is enough evidence in the public domain from judges 
to confirm the importance of such inquiries. Both the 2007 and 2010 Surveys indicate 
low public }}competence in judicial issues. Such competence is essential for the 
dynamics of contemporary Russian politics and becomes increasingly relevant as Russia 
becomes more integrated into a global legal sphere.26 
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